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REVIEW ESSAY
THE DOMAIN OF REFLEXIVE LAW
REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM. ByJean L. Co-
hen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pp. 277.
Reviewed by Michael C. Dorf*
In Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm, Jean Cohen syn-
thesizes liberal and egalitarian justifications for a right to sexual privacy.
Cohen proposes that regulation of sexual privacy, where permissible, be ac-
complished through "reflexive law." This Review Essay expresses broad sym-
pathy for Cohen's project, while suggesting an expansion. In Cohen's reflex-
ive paradigm, the sovereign in its lawmaking capacity sets general standards
that steer primary actors but simultaneously leave them with a substantial
zone of freedom in which to engage in self-regulation. Although it permits
substantial autonomy, Cohen's conception of reflexive law is essentially top-
down. This Review Essay offers an amended account of reflexive law in
which data drawn from experience at the relatively local level are continually
refined and transmitted to the relatively central standard-setter, which uses
the data continually to update the standards all must meet. This amended
account is accordingly both top-down and bottom-up, and for that reason it
may be particularly well-suited to contexts-such as regulation of issues
touching on sexual privacy-where the simple announcement of a controver-
sial legal norm would meet with substantial opposition.
INTRODUCTION
If a legal scholar were to write a book about the constitutional right
of privacy, the regulation of same-sex intimacy, and the law of sexual har-
assment, she would likely focus on questions of legal interpretation. Can
one infer a right of sexual intimacy from the open-ended language of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights? Are distinctions drawn
on the basis of sexual orientation analogous or equivalent to distinctions
based on sex, and thus presumptively invalid?1 Does the federal statutory
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. This essay is loosely based on
an oral presentation, on which I received very helpful comments from Jean Cohen, Reva
Siegel, Susan Sturm, and Kendall Thomas. Scott P. Martin provided excellent research
assistance and Bela August Walker oversaw a painless editing process.
1. Compare Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for
Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 915, 915-23 (1989) (providing an
affirmative answer), Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay
Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197, 201 (1994) (same), and Cass R. Sunstein,
Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 Ind. L.J. 1, 18-23 (1994) (same), with George W.
Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & Pol. 581, 608-14 (1999)
(providing a negative answer), and Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional
Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. Rev. 1, 83-88 (same).
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proscription of workplace discrimination "because of... sex"2 apply to a
superior's unwanted sexual advances toward his subordinates? And most
crucially: Do courts act legitimately in providing affirmative answers to
these questions, given societal disagreement about the underlying moral
questions?
Political scientist Jean Cohen has written a book about the constitu-
tional right of privacy, the regulation of same-sex intimacy, and the law of
sexual harassment, but these are not her questions. Instead, Cohen lo-
cates these issues within a theoretical debate between liberals and
welfarists, a term she uses to encompass civic republicans, feminists, and
egalitarians more broadly. Liberals rely on the public/private distinction
to secure a zone of personal autonomy that the state may not enter, but,
welfarists complain, in doing so, liberals license the abuse of private
power. The marital rape exemption dramatically illustrates how one
man's liberty can be another (wo)man's subordination. 3 Yet many egal-
itarians also recognize the value of limiting the state's ability to dictate
the terms of intimate relationships. Liberals and egalitarians alike think
the state should be able to prohibit marital rape but not same-sex inti-
macy. The regulation of intimacy is thus a site of contestation between
the sometimes conflicting claims of liberty and equality.
Cohen accepts the validity of what lawyers and legal scholars would
call the legal realist critique of liberal rights. She writes: "[I]t seems para-
doxical that privacy and autonomy rights are being asserted as fundamen-
tal in American jurisprudence just when their supporting philosophical
arguments seem no longer convincing."'4 Privacy, like property, is not a
presocial, prepolitical natural right, but the product of historically contin-
gent, dynamic social processes. Rights to privacy, like rights to anything
else, are not simply out there; they must be constructed.
In Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm, Cohen turns the
postmodern critique of rights on its head. So what that privacy rights
must be constructed, she says. We can agree with Jeremy Bentham that
prepolitical rights are "nonsense upon stilts," 5 and still deem rights valua-
ble. Accordingly, Cohen offers a "constructivist" justification of a right of
privacy, i.e., an account that is "constructed" from our situated experi-
ence and reflections. 6 "We must reason reflectively and constructively,"
Cohen writes, "in full awareness that it is we-not nature, tradition, or
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2000).
3. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law
101 (1987) ("[T]he legal concept of privacy can and has shielded the place of battery,
marital rape, and women's exploited labor .... ").
4. Jean L. Cohen, Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm 7 (2002) [hereinafter
Regulating Intimacy].
5. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in 2 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 501
(Edinburgh, John Bowring pub., W. Tait ed., 1843) (1824).
6. Regulating Intimacy, supra note 4, at 52-57.
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God-who give ourselves and interpret basic rights and the laws that con-
struct and protect our autonomy. '7
Although subtitled "A New Legal Paradigm," Regulating Intimacy actu-
ally offers two new legal paradigms. In addition to substituting construc-
tivism for what she deems antiquated naturalism in justifying and defin-
ing privacy rights, Cohen offers a new paradigmatic form of regulation of
intimacy and other activities: reflexive law. Cohen uses this term to
mean regulation of self-regulation, as opposed to traditional command-
and-control regulation. Regulation of self-regulation is reflexive because
the subject (regulation) "reflects" the object (self-regulation). In a chap-
ter that ably explains and critiques various continental versions of reflex-
ive law, Cohen advances her own particular account of reflexive law,8
which, she contends, can sometimes be used to ease the tensions between
liberty and equality that arise in the regulation of intimacy.9
Cohen "favor[s] publicly articulated general legal norms whose con-
tent, however, is developed on the local level through institutional (sub-
stantive and procedural) innovation oriented toward effective, fair prob-
lem solving."'10 This version of reflexive law is quite similar to what
Charles Sabel and I have called "democratic experimentalism,"' I and, not
surprisingly, I am sympathetic to Cohen's project. Her discussion of re-
flexive law in the context of the regulation of sexual harassment shows
how reflexive law allows individuals voice in the application and elabora-
tion of general norms such as gender equality.
Cohen does not think that reflexive law is a new legal paradigm in
the sense that it will or should replace traditional direct regulation.
Rather, she claims that the emerging reflexive law paradigm can be used
to supplement other forms of regulation. How should courts, legisla-
tures, and the public choose between reflexive law and other forms of
legal regulation? By using the same sort of processes that reflexive law
itself employs. In other words, these actors can articulate general, corrigi-
ble norms of norm selection, whose precise content will evolve over time
in response to practical experience. In this sense, Cohen contends that
reflexive law is not just a new paradigm of regulation but also a
"metaparadigm" for selecting among forms of regulation.12
This Essay elaborates and evaluates Cohen's claims for constructiv-
ism and reflexive law. Part I describes and analyzes Cohen's constructivist
7. Id. at 73.
8. Id. at 151-79.
9. As I explain below, Cohen uses the term reflexive law in two ways. Broadly, she
describes any system of regulation that leaves regulated actors with a zone of self-regulation
as reflexive. More narrowly-and more usefully-she also uses the term to connote
regulation by goal-setting to encourage local problem solving and norm internalization.
See infra text accompanying notes 33-35.
10. Regulating Intimacy, supra note 4, at 17.
11. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 267 (1998).
12. Regulating Intimacy, supra note 4, at 5.
[Vol. 103:384
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justification of a right of sexual intimacy. Part II examines her account of
reflexive law. Part III briefly explores a hypothesis suggested, but not ex-
pressly articulated, by Regulating Intimacy-that reflexive processes can be
used to implement morally divisive norms in ways that may make them
more acceptable to those who would otherwise be inclined to reject such
norms. I suggest that reflexive law can be employed to make rights revis-
able rather than permanent, and that conceptualizing rights as provi-
sional would draw some of the sting of recognizing rights in the face of
moral opposition.
I. A CONSTRUCTIVIST JUSTIFICATION OF A RIGHT TO SEXUAL INTIMACY
Cohen's constructivistjustification of a constitutional right of privacy
aims to preserve the core right while jettisoning its traditional association
with patriarchy, a strong public/private distinction, and natural rights. In
my view, she succeeds in showing the possibility of (re)constructing pri-
vacy along these lines, although she is vulnerable to a different criticism:
namely, that the particular conception of the right of privacy that she
constructs will not have universal appeal.
Cohen offers her constructivism as a solution to the apparent con-
flict between liberty and equality. Cohen proposes to resolve the tension
by formulating a right of privacy as a "fundamental right to equal liber-
ties."13 Like Ronald Dworkin, Cohen aims to show that "liberty and
equality are, in general, aspects of the same ideal, not, as is often sup-
posed, rivals."14 Thus, there is no inconsistency in granting consenting
adults the right to use contraception or to choose same-sex partners while
denying a husband's right to rape his wife. The former are examples of
freely chosen decisions, while the latter is an expression of freedom for
the man but subordination for the woman, and thus fundamentally in-
consistent with the notion of equal liberty for all.
Cohen's chapter on sexual orientation, for example, takes aim at the
argument that by claiming a right to privacy, sexual minorities relegate
themselves to the closet.15 If privacy only protects a right to be left alone,
privacy's critics contend, there is no correlative obligation on the govern-
ment to accept sexual minorities as full members of public society. On
this reasoning, privacy's champions have no capacity to criticize laws such
13. Id. at 53. Cohen takes this formulation from Jdrgen Habermas. See Juirgen
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy 82-31 (1996).
14. Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution 29 (1996).
15. See, e.g., Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet 71 (1990) (declaring
that "[tlhe closet is the defining structure for gay oppression in this century"); Kendall
Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1454-56 (1992)
(explaining that in relying on privacy, "'the closet' is less a refuge than a prisonhouse" for
gay men and lesbians).
2003]
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as the federal statute requiring that gay and lesbian members of the
armed services conceal their identities. 16
Cohen disagrees. A right of privacy, she insists, is not-or at least
need not be-a "duty of privacy."' 17 Indeed, she reminds us that what
makes "don't ask, don't tell" viable is precisely the fact that the Supreme
Court, in Bowers v. Hardwick, rejected a right of privacy encompassing same-
sex intimacy.' 8 Had the Court recognized such a right, the military policy
could not be justified on the ground that it aims at revelations of pros-
cribable conduct, for the underlying conduct-"a homosexual act or
acts"l 9 -would not be proscribable. In such a counterfactual world, a
military policy of excluding gays and lesbians would have to be justified by
reference to status, and that would raise serious equality questions. 20 As
Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer v. Evans2' underscores, the failure to ex-
tend privacy protection to sexual minorities complicates rather than as-
sists the argument for their equal status.
This is not to say that it is logically impossible to affirm a principle of
equality for sexual minorities without also recognizing privacy protection
for "homosexual conduct." The Romer majority clearly thought the two
principles compatible, as did some courts and commentators before
Romer.22 But Cohen is plainly right that Hardwick stood as an obstacle to
be overcome in making the equality argument, not as a building block in
that argument. More broadly, for Cohen, privacy and equality, properly
conceived, are complementary, not antagonistic. 2-
16. Subject to affirmative defenses, federal law requires discharge of members of the
armed services who engage (or attempt to engage) in a "homosexual act or acts," who state
that they are homosexual or bisexual, or who marry or attempt to marry a person of the
same sex. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (2000).
17. Regulating Intimacy, supra note 4, at 89.
18. 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
19. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)-(3).
20. Regulating Intimacy, supra note 4, at 91.
21. 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If it is constitutionally
permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally
permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct.").
22. See Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Def., 123 F.3d 1275, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997)
(invalidating gay armed services member's discharge under the predecessor policy to
"don't ask, don't tell"); Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 709-11 (9th Cir.
1989) (en banc) (same, invoking estoppel principle); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation
and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal
Protection, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161, 1163-64 (1988) (arguing that Hardwick did not
foreclose recognizing sexual orientation as an illegitimate basis for discrimination because
the equal protection principle is forward looking while the doctrine of substantive due
process has been understood as backward looking). But see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael
C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 116 (1991) ("[A]s a matter of... strategy, Sunstein's
proposal is a good one. As a matter of constitutional theory, however, his approach seems
somewhat dubious. It is hard to imagine a defensible approach to the two clauses that does
not take greater account of the inseparability of liberty and equality.").
23. Regulating Intimacy, supra note 4, at 92-94. The Supreme Court will soon decide
whether Hardwick remains good law. See Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App.
2001), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002). Should the Court overturn Hardwick, the
[Vol. 103:384
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Cohen makes a parallel maneuver with respect to the state action
doctrine. The decision to proclaim sexual freedom as a freedom from
government interference, she argues, does not necessarily prevent recog-
nition of a right, under some circumstances, to government assistance.
As she puts it, "Articulating [privacy] rights as negative liberties when ap-
propriate, as rights against the state, does not lock one into the liberal
legal paradigm. '24 The key words here are "when appropriate," for in
Cohen's constructivism, rights are always constructed, never taken for
granted. Accepting the legal realist critique of natural rights, for Cohen,
means recognizing that state action is omnipresent. We can construct a
right to abortion that includes a right to public funding of abortion if we
deem that decision appropriate. Or not. It is up to us.
Ah, but there's the rub, for who are we? Regulating Intimacy often
portrays modern legal doctrine governing sexual intimacy as responding
to the dramatic changes in the status of women over the last century, but
the book is not primarily a work of descriptive sociology. It sets forth a
normative argument for, among other things, a right to privacy. And the
public at large comprises the audience for that argument. Thus, the "we"
who must construct our rights includes the entire political community.
Moreover, the right to privacy Cohen champions is not merely urged
as a matter of policy. She envisions it as an essential precondition for
securing fair terms of social cooperation. Accordingly, it would not be
sufficient for Cohen's prescription to carry by a fifty-one to forty-nine per-
cent vote. She must secure universal assent. That burden, of course, is
impossible to meet, which is why Cohen settles for "the criterion of rea-
sonable nonrejectability,"25 rather than actual nonrejection.
It is not entirely clear how to assess arguments for reasonable
nonrejectability. In any polity that is not trivially small, it will be impossi-
ble to secure unanimous agreement on any set of fundamental political
principles. Two courses seem most fruitful. First, one could seek princi-
ples upon which there is general consensus, understood as something
more than a bare majority but less than unanimity. Second, one could
couch one's arguments, as Cohen does, in terms of nonrejectability,
where nonrejectability itself depends upon acceptance of higher-order
principles, for otherwise any proposition is, in principle, rejectable by
someone.
Cohen builds her argument on "what we now think it means to be
free as a person and an equal citizen. '2 6 Let us grant that, stated at this
decision would almost certainly rest on a view about discrimination based on sexual
orientation, even if the decision were formally to rest on an elaboration of the meaning of
liberty rather than equality.
24. Regulating Intimacy, supra note 4, at 75.
25. Id. at 53.
26. Id. at 73. Although the American Constitution's liberty-bearing provisions
generally attach to "persons" rather than to the narrower category of "citizens," Cohen
appears to use the terms interchangeably, as will I for these purposes.
2003]
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level of abstraction, this principle is widely accepted. There remains
profound disagreement about what liberties are required to be a free and
equal citizen.
Some of that disagreement can perhaps be dismissed as insincere.
People who champion a marital rape exemption do not really think that
women should be treated as equal citizens, even if they rationalize their
position on the ground that such an exemption can be written in for-
mally gender-neutral terms.
But not all disagreement can be so readily dismissed. Some opposi-
tion to abortion is rooted in a belief that women should occupy a
subordinate role or in purely religious considerations that may not be an
appropriate basis for legislation. However, it is certainly possible to be-
lieve, on secular grounds, that abortion should be proscribed out of con-
cern for the wellbeing of the fetus, notwithstanding the insult to sex
equality. After all, even Cohen thinks that "rights are not absolute
trumps; they are mechanisms that trigger inquiry into the justification for
governmental decisions. ' 27 Certainly there can be reasonable disagree-
ment about the point in pregnancy (if any) at which the interest in fetal
life blossoms into a sufficient justification for an abortion prohibition.
Nor is abortion a special case. The state routinely prohibits adultery,
polygamy, and consensual nonprocreative adult sibling incest. With re-
spect to each of these practices, there is a plausible prima facie claim for
inclusion within the right of privacy, but also a plausible argument for
overcoming that right. Adultery might be prohibited as a means of giving
effect to a right to marriage (at least where the parties agree in advance
to the prohibition); polygamy can be seen as inherently exploitative (al-
though not without assuming false consciousness); and nonprocreative
adult sibling incest might be proscribed as a prophylactic measure to re-
inforce a taboo that protects the health of offspring (although it is hardly
clear that the taboo requires official enforcement). Can arguments to
include or exclude any of these practices in a constitutional right of pri-
vacy fairly be characterized as nonrejectable?
Given the nature of the debate, nonrejectability is probably too
strong a criterion for inclusion within the right to privacy. Perhaps Co-
hen would do better to follow the alternative strategy I suggested above-
to root protection for the specific entailments of a right of privacy in
consensus. If that is the goal, then her argument should be understood
not as a meta-argument for the nonrejectability of her claims but as a
simple effort to persuade people to adopt her understanding of the right
of privacy. Despite her talk about reasonable nonrejectability, under-
standing her project in this way would better jibe with her democratic
sentiments-the idea that "we" must collectively construct our rights.
However, Regulating Intimacy is unlikely to change many minds. For
one thing, it is a distinctly academic book, rewarding though sometimes
27. Id. at 74.
[Vol. 103:384
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difficult going, even for other academics. More fundamentally, while Co-
hen's response to egalitarian critics is interestingly original, her argument
for the particular entailments of the right to privacy-i.e., the argument
that takes aim at anti-abortion traditionalists and the like-is rather famil-
iar. In discussing abortion, for example, she emphasizes the body: "It
should be obvious that to force a woman to endure an unwanted preg-
nancy is to partially impose an identity upon her-the identity of preg-
nant woman/mother. '2 8 No doubt the point is obvious by now, 29 but, if
that is so, then stating it again will not persuade those who nonetheless
think that there is a sufficient justification for imposing an identity on
women.
To be clear, Regulating Intimacy makes important points in what is
best understood as an intramural debate among left-leaning liberals and
egalitarians. It has substantially less to say in favor of the right to privacy
to those outside that debate.
II. REFLEXrVE LAW
Cohen's invocation of reflexive law distinguishes Regulating Intimacy
from other efforts to synthesize liberal and egalitarian commitments.
What is reflexive law and what work does it do in Cohen's approach?
Let us be clear about what reflexive law is not. In her constructionist
mode, Cohen emphasizes that we, the polity, choose our rights, and,
therefore, we must be reflective about what rights we want and what legal
forms we want to instantiate those rights. However, Cohen does not
mean reflexive law as a synonym for reflecting, i.e., thinking hard, about
the choice of rights and forms of regulation. She writes "that reflection
(knowledge) and self-reflection (self-knowledge and thinking about
thought) are different from reflexivity even if self-reflection is one form
of the latter."30 Reflexivity is Cohen's general term for a circumstance in
which the subject mirrors (reflects) the object. Thus, thinking about
thought is reflexive thought, cleaning a vacuum cleaner (my example,
not Cohen's) is reflexive cleaning, and regulation of regulation is reflex-
ive law.
Cohen's account of the general right of privacy makes that right re-
flexive in a limited sense. The law governing intimacy regulates what hap-
pens inside intimate relations, and the actors involved in such relations
govern, or regulate, themselves. For example, in a chapter on family law,
Cohen criticizes traditional conceptions of the marital unit as an entity
(generally equated with the husband), classical liberal conceptions of
marriage as purely voluntarist and contractual, and communitarian vi-
28. Id. at 61.
29. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 788 (1989)
("[L]aws against abortion . . . confine, normalize, and functionalize identities .... Anti-
abortion laws produce motherhood.").
30. Regulating Intimacy, supra note 4, at 166.
2003]
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sions that, in her view, overreact to the liberal model in advocating a re-
turn from contract to status.31 Cohen proposes instead that the state reg-
ulate the forms and terms of marriage, while reserving to individuals who
decide to marry substantial ability to govern themselves. Though
bounded by the constraint of equal liberty, in Cohen's "understanding
the constitutionalization of individualized privacy rights ascribes to the
intimate associates themselves the competence to choose the forms in
which they pursue happiness and attempt to realize their conceptions of
the good of intimacy. '32 Regulation of such an institution is thus regula-
tion of self-regulation, or in Cohen's terminology, reflexive.
However, Cohen's constitutional right of privacy is reflexive in only a
limited-and not especially interesting-way. Regulation of any institu-
tion in which the regulated actors exercise some power to regulate them-
selves is, on Cohen's criterion, reflexive. And since only totalitarianism
regulates everything, leaving persons and institutions with no choices, it
would appear that in a free society, all regulation is regulation of self-
regulation. What, then, is the point of applying the term reflexive law to
any particular field of regulation?
The point, for Cohen anyway, is to steer a middle path between com-
munitarianism and libertarianism. As against communitarians, Cohen in-
sists on the utility of "rights talk,"3 3 while as against libertarians, Cohen
insists that rights are not absolute.34 Yet with the exception of Hugo
Black, almost no mainstream American liberal has maintained that rights
cannot be derogated if necessary to advance a sufficiently important gov-
ernment objective. 35 Indeed, it has long been blackletter constitutional
law that fundamental rights-including the right to privacy-can be over-
ridden when necessary to advance a compelling government interest.36
Only if one equates the liberal paradigm with rights absolutism does a
31. Id. at 180-203.
32. Id. at 198.
33. Id. at 72. For a communitarian critique of "rights talk," see generally Mary Ann
Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (1991).
34. Regulating Intimacy, supra note 4, at 74.
35. Whether Ronald Dworkin counts as another exception is an interesting question
that I do not address here. Certainly Dworkin's idea that rights are trumps suggests that no
mere utilitarian interest suffices to overcome a right. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously 193 (1977). Yet another of Dworkin's signature ideas-that legal principles
(including, presumably, principles giving rise to rights) have weight rather than a simple
on/off character, see id. at 26-indicates that rights are derogable, that they can be
outweighed.
36. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) ("[W]here a
decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations
imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be
narrowly drawn to express only those interests." (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56
(1973) (citations omitted))); see also, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are not Trumps:
Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27J. Legal Stud. 725, 727-33
(1998) (arguing that the more accurate conception of American constitutional law treats
rights as subject to being overridden rather than as absolute "trumps").
[Vol. 103:384
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shift to Cohen's constructivism result in a parallel shift to derogable
rights, and only then would the fact that recognizing rights still leaves
room for state regulation appear novel. But if one begins with the as-
sumption that rights need not be absolute, then referring to the partial
regulation of rights-bearers as regulation of self-regulation, and thus re-
flexive law, does not distinguish Cohen's paradigm from the prior, liberal
one. We are, and have been for quite some time, all champions of reflex-
ive law.
Nevertheless, in her discussion of the law of sexual harassment, Co-
hen does use the notion of reflexive law in an interesting and novel way.
She begins her discussion of sexual harassment law where her discussion
of privacy and sexual orientation leave off. Where the first two chapters
of Regulating Intimacy defend a liberal construct-the right of privacy-
against an egalitarian critique, most of Chapter Three defends an egalita-
rian construct-the prohibition of sexual harassment-against liberal ob-
jections.37 At the end of that chapter, however, Cohen addresses a quite
different issue: Where the state chooses regulation of the workplace,
what form should that regulation take? She answers this question by
pointing to existing law, which, she notes, consists of "federally estab-
lished incentives to employer self-regulation, conciliation procedures,
and a private cause of action,"3 8 an ensemble that she calls-you guessed
it-reflexive law.
In describing the structure of sexual harassment law as reflexive, Co-
hen has in mind a departure from what might be called, for lack of a
better term, command-and-control regulation. In the latter, where the
government perceives a need to intervene in private ordering, it com-
mands an outcome. A prohibition on intentional homicide is a com-
mand-and-control regulation, as is a requirement that new automobiles
be equipped with airbags. By contrast, a requirement that new automo-
biles meet a safety performance standard set by representatives of the au-
tomobile industry and consumer groups would be reflexive in the way
that Cohen has in mind. Government regulates reflexively by setting a
general standard to govern self-regulation by the affected actors. (To
state this set of examples is to make clear that reflexivity and, as it were,
command-and-control-ness, are matters of degree. "Airbag" or even
"airbag made of thus and such materials" is itself a general standard in
the sense that it does not dictate every last detail of the safety device. But
the difference between specific rules and general standards is clear
enough that we can pass over this point.3 9 )
37. Regulating Intimacy, supra note 4, at 125-42.
38. Id. at 149.
39. Another way to put the point: Reflexive law relies on standards rather than rules,
but as we know, standard-ness and rule-ness are matters of degree. See Margaret Jane
Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 823, 828-32
(1991) (explaining that rules and standards are relative terms in the course of arguing that
judges are more apt to follow rules when they perceive the moral stakes as low).
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In what sense is the law of sexual harassment reflexive rather than
command-and-control-ish? The actual requirements of Title VII, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court, are quite ambiguous. Although Court doc-
trine declares it illegal for an employer to demand that an employee sub-
mit to a quid pro quo or to create (or tolerate) a hostile work
environment,40 the leading decisions leave open substantial questions of
application and scope.4 1 Beyond questions of coverage is the matter of
employer liability. Most businesses covered by Title VII are large enter-
prises which can only harass (or perform other acts) through their
agents. Under what circumstances is a business liable under Title VII for
the harassing acts of its employees? The law provides a reflexive answer:
Vicarious liability attaches unless the employer has "exercised reasonable
care to avoid harassment and to eliminate it when it might occur."42 In
other words, sexual harassment law operates by regulating employers'
regulation of their own workplaces. It is reflexive in an interesting way.
Cohen approves of this form of regulation because of its capacity to
induce employers and employees to internalize the legal norm against
sexual harassment.43 And indeed, case studies by my colleague Susan
Sturm indicate that some employers have deployed successful systems by
integrating harassment prevention and remediation with other opera-
tions.44 Further, because employers shape their harassment policies to
meet the unique circumstances of their particular workplaces, the law
guides but does not determine their content.45 Finally, as both Sturm
and Cohen observe, vicarious liability realigns incentives. By contrast
40. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (holding that an abusive
work environment can and often will violate Title VII even if it does not "seriously affect
employees' psychological well-being"); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66
(1986) (accepting EEOC interpretation that sexual harassment violates Title VII "whether
or not it is directly linked to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where 'such
conduct has the purpose or effect of ... creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment"' (quoting EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985))).
41. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 Stan.
L. Rev. 691, 693 (1997) (arguing that existing theories "provide indeterminate and
unprincipled outcomes to both central and marginal cases of sexual harassment"). See
generally Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1683 (1998)
(arguing that courts' emphasis on sexual desire as a necessary component of sexual
harassment prevents extension of claims to cases where harassment occurs because of the
employee's sex, rather than because of sexual desire for the employee).
42. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998) (adding that the
employer must also show "that the complaining employee had failed to act with like
reasonable care to take advantage of the employer's safeguards"); accord Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (stating the same test articulated in
Faragher).
43. Regulating Intimacy, supra note 4, at 149-50.
44. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 492-520 (2001) (describing approaches at Deloitte &
Touche, Intel, and Home Depot).
45. Id. at 520.
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with a command-and-control approach that prohibits designated acts
given a particular scienter, under current (reflexive) doctrine, employers
are liable for failing to know what is happening under their noses, be-
cause ignorance signals an inadequate policy of detection and remedia-
tion. The doctrine thereby encourages problem solving.4 6
From her concrete explanation of the reflexive paradigm in the sex-
ual harassment example, Cohen moves several steps up the ladder of ab-
straction in discussing "The Debate over the Reflexive Paradigm," as she
titles Chapter Four, which summarizes and criticizes the leading accounts
of reflexivity (under various names). In my view, this chapter obfuscates
more than it clarifies, not because of any flaw in Cohen's recounting of
the theorists she discusses, but because the theories are unnecessary to
understanding the utility of reflexive law.
Cohen's discussion of Gunther Teubner is illustrative. Teubner ar-
gues that modern society is so complex and fractured that command-and-
control regulation is bound to fail. 4 7 Reflexive law is thus the best tool
for the society in general to influence the individual social subsystems
with which the law interacts, because it encourages actors within subsys-
tems to internalize the general norm. Teubner builds on the work of
Niklas Luhmann, who used the term "autopoiesis" to describe social sub-
systems that operate by their own logic relatively autonomously of one
another.48 Teubner and Luhmann acknowledge that distinct subsys-
tems-such as law49 and work-interact with one another, but they do so
from a distance, which is why, in this account, reflexive law is preferable
to other forms of regulation that assume greater permeability between
subsystems.
Yet if, as Teubner argues, law and other disciplines are autopoietic,
one immediately wants to know how these subsystems interact. That is
the central dilemma that Teubner's work addresses.50 And, as Cohen ex-
46. See Regulating Intimacy, supra note 4, at 148-49 (noting that existing law
provides an incentive for over-regulation and proposing an open-ended norm that would
encourage problem solving and realign incentives); Sturm, supra note 44, at 482 (arguing
that vicarious liability "makes the creation of an administrative problem-solving process a
part of an employer's legal obligation").
47. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 Law &
Soc'y Rev. 239, 270-85 (1983).
48. Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft 30 (1993) (applying the theory of
autopoiesis to law). For criticism and exegesis of autopoiesis, see Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis
and the "Relative Autonomy" of Law, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 1987, 1997 (1998) (arguing that
"whether or not one decides to adopt Luhmann's categories and terminology in one's own
work, Luhmann's autopoietic theory still can operate as a productive stimulus for legal
theory").
49. Significantly, in this account, law itself is an autopoietic subsystem. See generally
Luhmann, supra note 48.
50. See Gunther Teubner, After Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of Post-
Regulatory Law, in Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State 299 (Gunther Teubner ed.,
1986); Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Zenon Bankowski ed., Anne
Bankowska & Ruth Alder trans., 1993); Gunther Teubner, Social Order from Legislative
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plains, Teubner has no general solution: "He insists that reflexion
processes have to differ according to the specific internal logic of the
regulated subsystem." 51 But if that is so, one wants to ask, why do we care
that subsystems are uniform in their relative autonomy? If they are di-
verse in how they respond to external efforts at regulation, we need to
know about the details of individual domains of regulation, not about the
general phenomenon of autopoiesis.
Cohen agrees. She deems it unnecessary "to buy into the thesis of
self-referentially closed, autopoietic subsystems" 52  to appreciate
Teubner's argument. Yet, stripped of autopoiesis, Teubner's approach
borders on the banal, and, as presented by Cohen, Teubner's stripped-
down theory yields no useful prescription. It says, in essence: Life is com-
plicated, so regulate reflexively. But what counts as effective reflexive reg-
ulation is also complicated, defying cross-disciplinary explanation.
Cohen addresses other champions of the reflexive paradigm besides
Teubner, eventually developing her own synthesis. 53 She makes an im-
portant contribution by constructing a firewall between reflexive law and
privatization. Acknowledging that reflexive law does afford regulated ac-
tors some autonomy, she denies that it is completely indeterminate. Al-
though "[r] eflexive law does not determine specific outcomes ... it steers
self-regulation in the right direction" 5 "4-i.e., in the general direction set
by the polity through its collective legal processes.
Ultimately, however, Cohen shares Teubner's reluctance to genera-
lize about where and how reflexive law may be useful. Enamored of the
notion of reflexivity as a "metaparadigm" for selecting among forms of
regulation, 55 she leaves for reflexive processes the determination of
where to apply reflexive law.56
III. A ROLE FOR REFLEXIVE LAW IN IMPLEMENTING A RIGHT
TO SEXUAL INTIMACY?
Cohen is plainly right that reflexive law cannot and should not re-
place command-and-control regulation in all domains. Certainly it would
be unwise, for example, to replace the homicide prohibition with a gen-
eral goal of "respect for human life" to be interpreted and implemented
through local participatory processes. Likewise, we would not do well to
exchange the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery for a general goal
of "encouraging human freedom." Categorical rules have their uses.
Noise? Autopoietic Closure as a Problem for Legal Regulation, in State, Law, and
Economy as Autopoietic Systems: Regulation and Autonomy in a New Perspective 609
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1992).
51. Regulating Intimacy, supra note 4, at 156.
52. Id. at 153.
53. Id. at 157-79.
54. Id. at 178.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. at 176.
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Despite her caution that reflexive law is not always the most appro-
priate legal form, by introducing it in the context of a book on the regula-
tion of intimacy, Cohen suggests that it is well suited to addressing many
aspects of the regulation of intimacy. However, Regulating Intimacy does
not explain how reflexive law-of the interesting sort, i.e., as a distinct
form of regulation-can provide traction on the problem that takes up
roughly the first half of the book: defining the contours of rights to
intimacy.
Indeed, there is at least a prima facie reason to think that reflexive
law is particularly poorly suited to defining the right of privacy, given the
fact of moral disagreement. As Cohen cogently explains, what distin-
guishes reflexive law from, on the one side, deregulation, and, on the
other side, command-and-control, is that reflexive law sets goals or princi-
ples that "are broad enough to leave particular ways of conforming with
them relatively open and to permit local, contextual development of the
content of these norms, but they are not completely indeterminate." 57
One might, therefore, think that reflexive law is best suited to questions
as to which there is consensus on broad goals or principles, but uncer-
tainty about means. For example, the reflexive paradigm could be in-
voked in favor of a performance standard capping emissions of some pol-
lutant rather than specifying a particular technology (such as scrubbers)
that must be used to achieve that standard. 58 Similarly, where society has
decided to bar workplace sexual harassment (in the United States, by leg-
islative acquiescence to judicial decisions interpreting a statute barring
sex discrimination), reflexive law can be used in combination with re-
spondeat superior liability to encourage employers to develop their own
procedures for preventing and remedying harassment. However, where
there is deep social disagreement-over, for example, whether abortion
ought to be a right or a crime-how can reflexive law be of use?
Although Cohen brackets the counter-majoritarian difficulty,59 she
cannot escape the difficulty posed by moral disagreement. Let us grant
that the question of how to define a right of privacy is addressed to the
public or its elected representatives. How are they to cope with the fact
that people hold quite different views about the proper dimensions of a
right of privacy?
Cohen's discussion of sexual harassment suggests a possible answer.
Like abortion, gay rights, and other subjects addressed in Regulating Inti-
macy, the legal prohibition of sexual harassment has been intensely con-
troversial. Popular fiction in the 1990s appealed to the sentiment-no
doubt felt by a great many men and some women-that false charges of
57. Id. at 178.
58. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11, at 349-51 (describing advantages of
performance standards over design standards).
59. Regulating Intimacy, supra note 4, at 8; see also Alexander M. Bickel, The Least
Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 16-23 (1962) (examining
counter-majoritarian nature of judicial review).
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sexual harassment were rampant,60 while sexual harassment scandals at
the highest levels of every branch of the federal government, 6 1 hinted at
widespread failure of even national leaders to internalize the anti-harass-
ment norm. Under such circumstances, reflexive law's ability to engen-
der internalization of the anti-harassment norm-as indicated by Sturm's
case studies-is impressive.
Nonetheless, inducing recalcitrant actors to accept a previously-re-
jected norm is not the same problem as deciding, collectively, what our
legal norms should be. What if people are deeply and closely divided on
the propriety of the legal norm itself? Reflexive law may not issue firm
mandates, but it does require broadly defined goals, and much of the
controversy regarding the domain of intimacy concerns goals: whether to
treat abortion as a right; whether to privilege heterosexual lives; and so
forth.
I want to suggest that reflexive law can be useful even where there is
no agreement about goals. To see how that might be so requires an
emendation to (or possibly only a clarification of) Cohen's account of
reflexivity. For Cohen, as for systems theorists like Luhmann and
Teubner, reflexive law is a mechanism by which collective decisions of
society as a whole steer other actors and institutions. In my version (dem-
ocratic experimentalism), it is also a mechanism by which relatively local
actors and institutions influence collective decisions.
To make that last point concrete, consider the role of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in enforcing the anti-harass-
ment norm. Given the structure of that norm, the EEOC might "take the
lead in disseminating the most successful strategies for preventing and
combating sexual harassment. '62 To do so would first require the EEOC
to be familiar with those strategies, in other words, for it to compile lists
of what are sometimes called "best practices." Those best practices, of
course, come from the regulated entities themselves. As in the case of
discerning the best currently known method of minimizing the produc-
tion of some harmful pollutant, so with sexual harassment, the role of the
central government (or in some cases, nongovernment actor) is to set
initial goals, collect data from the regulated entities about what works
and what does not, and then disseminate that information back to the
60. See, e.g., David Mamet, Oleanna (1993); Disclosure (Warner Bros. 1994).
61. See generally S. Rep. No. 104-137, at 14 (1995) ("Packwood Report")
(accompanying committee resolution to discipline Senator Robert Packwood, in part for
"sexual misconduct"); Office of the Indep. Counsel, Referral to the United States House of
Representatives pursuant to Title 28, United States Code § 595(c) (Sept. 9, 1998) ("Starr
Report"), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/icreport (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (presenting findings, inter alia, of misconduct by President Clinton);Jane Mayer &
Jill Abramson, Strange Justice: The Selling of Clarence Thomas 6 (1994) (describing
conflicting testimony of Anita Hill and Justice Thomas as having "become part [of] an
active battlefront in America's culture wars").
62. Michael C. Doff, The Supreme Court 1997 Term-Foreword: The Limits of
Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 77 (1998).
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regulated entities so that they may learn from each other's successes and
failures. The entire process is then repeated, leading to a regime of "roll-
ing" regulation, in which performance standards are continually ratch-
eted up as local experimentation reveals what is possible.
63
A rolling regulatory regime is not simply a mechanism for finding
ever-better means of achieving fixed ends. It can also lead to the transfor-
mation of ends, because human activity rarely proceeds with a single-
minded focus. A regime for producing clean air may lead petroleum re-
finers to include an additive in gasoline that leaches out of storage tanks
into ground water, inducing regulators to reformulate their goal as mini-
mizing the combined impacts on air and water. 64 Efforts to implement
workplace antidiscrimination norms (including but not limited to the
norm against sexual harassment) may raise a distinct but related prob-
lem: The background presumption that employers may terminate em-
ployees for arbitrary but nondiscriminatory reasons undermines antidis-
crimination law by complicating issues of proof; accordingly, a regulator
might be led to question and then supplant the employment-at-will
rule.65 More broadly, reflexive law, like the social processes it aims to
influence and by which it is influenced, should be conceived in dynamic,
multidirectional terms.
Implementing controversial norms-such as the prohibition against
sexual harassment or the right to abortion-through reflexive processes
can draw some of the sting from the defeat of those who oppose those
norms at the level of goals. First, by encouraging local, participatory
processes in the implementation of relatively open-ended norms, reflex-
ive law gives citizens some voice in their application, and thus their mean-
ing in context. Second, if, as I have suggested, reflexivity goes both up
and down, local participation always has ingredient in it the prospect of
changing the principal norm.
To the extent that Cohen's project addresses the question of how a
polity chooses its constitutional norms, legal processes seem almost des-
tined to follow the iterative course just described. For example, in the
United States, despite extraordinary obstacles to constitutional amend-
ment, the movements for abolition and for civil and political rights for
African Americans played an important role in inspiring the movements
63. Dorf& Sabel, supra note 11, at 350-54 (describing regulation by rolling rules); id.
at 464 (suggesting possibility of rolling regime for definition of constitutional rights).
64. See Cal. Exec. Order No. D-5-99 (Mar. 25, 1999), available at http://www.energy.
ca.gov/mtbe/davisorders.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (prohibiting
inclusion of oxygenate Methyl Tertiary-Butyl Ether (MTBE) in gasoline after Dec. 31,
2002); Cal. Exec. Order No. D-52-02 (Mar. 15, 2002), available at http://www.energy.ca.
gov/mtbe/davis_orders.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (extending deadline
for MTBE-free gasoline by one year).
65. For an argument to this effect, see Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge
Protections in an At-Will World, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1655, 1678-82 (1996).
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for women's suffrage and equal rights, 66 as well as subsequent rights
movements, such as gay liberation. A movement for rights for one group
succeeds in changing the law (whether by judicial interpretation, consti-
tutional amendment, or legislative action), and that movement, along
with the social changes that occur in response to the new law, in turn
inspire movements for other rights, which if successful, repeat the pro-
cess. Over time, the meaning and scope of the underlying norm that the
rights movement seeks to vindicate change profoundly.
Yet the processes just described typically play out over the course of a
generation or more. If one accepts Cohen's constructivist claim that
"we," the people of the here and now, must construct our own rights,
even if we construct them in part from inherited texts, then there must
be some mechanism by which our goal-articulating organs such as Con-
gress and the Supreme Court can respond in real time to the percolating
up redefinitions of basic rights. With respect to the Court, one would
demand, at a minimum, that the Court be exposed and responsive to
what Frank Michelman terms "the full blast of sundry opinions and inter-
est-articulations in society. '6 7 And a Court that gives no room to biparti-
san majorities in Congress to expand constitutional understandings of re-
ligious freedom, 68 women's equality, 69 discrimination against the old, 70
and the rights of those with disabilities, 7' is hardly acting responsively.
Accordingly, despite her desire to bracket the counter-majoritarian diffi-
culty, Cohen's vision of reflexive law-subject to what I expect she would
regard as my friendly amendment to make clear that norms move in both
directions between the center and the periphery-provides ample
grounds for criticizing the Supreme Court as insufficiently attentive to
democratic values.
CONCLUSION
Criticism of the Supreme Court, of course, is not the point of Regulat-
ing Intimacy, which is not a book for lawyers. Nonetheless, lawyers and
66. See Michael C. Dorf, The Paths to Legal Equality: A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90
Cal. L. Rev. 791, 798 (2002) (noting that in the 1960s, "as it had a century earlier, the
struggle for racial equality led to a movement for women's equality").
67. Frank 1. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy 60 (1999).
68. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (invalidating Religious
Freedom Restoration Act and disallowing Congress' power to expand definition of rights
under Fourteenth Amendment).
69. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-27 (2000) (holding that civil
remedy provision of Violence Against Women Act was not a valid exercise of power to
enforce Fourteenth Amendment).
70. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (holding that Age
Discrimination in Employment Act was not a valid exercise of power to enforce Fourteenth
Amendment, and, therefore, could not abrogate state sovereign immunity).
71. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding
that Americans With Disabilities Act was not a valid exercise of power to enforce
Fourteenth Amendment, and, therefore, could not abrogate state sovereign immunity).
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legal academics can profit from it in two ways. First, by offering an argu-
ment for a right of privacy without the distraction of the usual hand-
wringing over judicial role, Cohen challenges each reader to defend his
or her own normative account of liberty and equality. Second, by intro-
ducing the concept of reflexive law into the debate over the regulation of
intimacy, Cohen suggests that our collective disagreements do not invari-
ably boil down to first-order moral disagreements.
In an era when, distressingly, the best-known self-styled legal pragma-
tist proclaims moral discourse worthless,72 Cohen strikes a blow for a
more optimistic sort of pragmatism than Judge Posner's pragmatism-as-
instrumentalism. 73 By proposing a role for reflexive law outside the
realm of technocracy, Cohen offers the possibility that our collective ef-
forts to solve our practical problems can aid in articulating the rights that
define the kinds of persons we are.
72. See Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 1637, 1637 (1998). To be fair, Judge Posner does not say all moral discourse is
useless, but he would clearly include the sort of Rawlsian constructivism in which Cohen
engages in the category of "academic moralism" that he derides. See id. at 1639-40
(including John Rawls on the hit list).
73. See Michael C. Doff, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 593,
595-96 (1999) (distinguishing between philosophical pragmatism and pragmatism-as-
instrumentalism).
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